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Abstract
The article discusses the efficacy of relying on market
mechanisms to guide growth of economic networks, with special
reference to information technology markets. Many insights into
the efficacy of relying on market mechanisms are not consistent
with one another, nor do they all transparently synthesize into a
single policy vision. Thus, extending this literature
appropriately should have some value. A secondary purpose of this
essay is to identify important issues that remain unaddressed and
indicate directions towards potential answers.

I. Introduction
The traditional model of the telecommunications network
operated by a single paternal regulated firm ceased to be
relevant in the United States some time ago. No single
organization today internalizes the majority of design decisions,
upgrading and maintenance problems associated with
telecommunications networks. The network employed by the typical
user blends some amount of communications technologies and
computing technologies from scores of different public and
private firms. Some information technologies, like a local area
network in an office, are physically small and technically
simple. Other information technologies, such as the private
telephone networks, potentially cover large geographic areas and
employ expensive and technically complex equipment.
It is an oversimplification, though not far off the mark, to
observe that the locus of decision making regarding
telecommunications networks has changed in the last three
decades. Important network development decisions have
increasingly moved out of the administrative offices of AT&T and
into the offices of firms who answer to decentralized market-
based mechanisms. It is also not far off the mark to observe that
this change did not occur as a result of any single policy
vision. Rather, it was the result of many technical, economic and
legal factors. Indeed, it is the absence of a single guiding
policy vision that raises concerns about the efficacy of the
mechanisms guiding private network development and growth today.
The primary purpose of this essay is to summarize for the
non-specialist the insights made by economists about the costs
and benefits of relying on market-based mechanisms for
decentralized network development. Economists have been concerned
about these issues in the rather recent literature on network
economics and standardization. This literature contains many
useful insights, but not all of them are consistent with one
another, nor do they all transparently synthesize into a single
policy vision that is accessible to the non-specialist. Thus,
extending this literature with an eye towards practical
applications should have some value. A second purpose for this
essay is to identify important issues that remain unaddressed and
point towards the direction of answers.
The key to this literature is an economist's definition of a
network. An economic network is composed of all buyers and
suppliers who have economic incentive to care about a system's
technical features (e.g, Wade [1992]). This concern for
technology arises either out of the desire for all users to
communicate with one another, as in a traditional telephone
network (Rohlfs [1974]), or out of the need for all electronic
components to work with each other, as when an industry-wide
network of buyers uses the same "standard bundle" (Bresnahan and
Greenstein [1992]).
The term "economic network" is often confusing to those who
view a telecommunications network as nothing more than just its
physical linkages and its electronic signals. To an economist
there is more to an economic network than just the physical
equipment extant today, because economic relationships extend
beyond physical boundaries of equipment. Only when AT&T
controlled virtually the whole telephone network was the physical
network and the economic network synonymous. Indeed, today many
buyers and sellers of the same information technology may not buy
equipment or services from the exact same supplier, but they may
be a subset of the same economic network if they use compatible
equipment.
As a technical matter, an "economic network" is centered
around interoperability, which means that a component may serve
as a sub-system within a larger arrangement of components. In the
simplest case, compatibility-standards can define the physical
fit of two components. Familiar examples are modular phone jacks
on telephone lines and handsets, and compatible telephone
switches. More complex are the standards that determine
electronic communication channels. The need for these standards
is obvious, since successfully filtering, transmitting and
translating voices across telecommunication networks requires
precise engineering. Similar needs arise in the design of
circuitry between computers, their operating system and
application software programs.
More generally, compatibility solves but one issue in a
wider array of coordination problems. Most on-line commercial
networks, such as Prodigy, CompuServe or America On-line, or the
private networks of thousands of commercial organizations, such
as Citibank and K-Mart, are sophisticated electronic networks.
These often involve on-line transaction processing, employ a mix
of sophisticated telecommunications and computing equipment, and
must operate reliably on a daily basis. Accomplishing this
involves all the coordination activities associated with the
successful management of a business enterprise. Products and
services must be defined and tied to billing, output must be
controlled and its quality assured, electronic signals must be
routed without hesitation and so on. Someone, a designer or some
organization, must also plan and develop capital capacity and
plan the requisite staffing to meet long run service needs.
Sometimes these decisions involve coordinating actions within a
single organization. More often then not, they involve
coordinating decisions across divisions within the same company,
or between upstream and downstream vendors, or between a vendor
and a governmental decision maker.
Economic research to date focuses primarily on the factors
influencing the development of compatibility standards. This
focus on the nexus of economics and technology is a bit narrow,
since it ignores important organizational costs. After all, for
two networks to remain technically compatible two organizations
must coordinate substantial personnel and operating costs.
Nonetheless, this does not invalidate the merits of the analysis
of compatibility, since interoperability is necessary for any
coordination on any level. It simply means that standard analysis
leaves aside lots of the messy details of coordinating
organizations in practice. This review will try to point out
where this hole matters and where it does not.
Finally, one other key to the literature is the economist's
taxonomy of processes that develop economic networks. Unfettered
market processes may develop economic networks as a de facto
result of either a "sponsored" or an "unsponsored" market process
(David and Greenstein [1990]). In a sponsored process, one or
more entities, suppliers, or cooperative ventures, creates
inducements for other economic decision-makers to adopt a
particular set of technical specifications and become part of an
economic network (e.g., pre-divestiture AT&T-sponsored
telecommunication standards) . An unsponsored process has no
identified originator with a proprietary interest, yet follows
well-documented specifications (e.g., the QWERTY keyboard).
Voluntary industry self-regulation may also play a role when
economic networks arise out of the deliberations of voluntary
standards-writing organizations (e.g., ANSI). Of course,
government bodies may also shape the development of economic
networks (e.g, FCC)
.
There is no compelling reason for government organizations
to become involved in the development of every network. They
often do so because important public policy issues are at stake.
They often do not do so because exogenous forces, such as
dramatic technical change, outstrip the ability of any
administrative process to guide events and it may be easier to
leave decisions to market participants. The question of when it
is best to rely on a market process instead of an government
decision making is an open and active topic of debate, since it
usually swings on trade-offs between imperfect market processes
and imperfect government intervention. 1
This article will focus on one part of this debate:
understanding the efficacy of relying on decentralized market-
based decision making processes and private organizations — i.e.
with minimal government intervention. Following the existing
literature, this discussion examines the incentives of market
participants who are supplying and demanding compatibility
standards for an economic network. Since the literature on this
topic continually grows, in no way does this article represent a
complete review of all the literature's ideas. Rather, it is a
select look at the economic factors that will likely influence
the development of private telecommunication networks.
II. Invisible Hands?: Market Based Decisions
In many cases the initial ownership of assets strongly
limits the number of vendors that can feasibly produce for a
market. As a result, economists have tended to analyze the
development of economic networks as an outgrowth of an initial
market structure, such as the number of firms. This approach
tends to work well for short run analysis. Under a long-run view,
the ultimate supply of interrelated components and the embodiment
of technical standards in networks capacity requires a different
approach. Technical innovation influences the adoption of
standards, and is influenced by it, which ultimately influences
long run network development.
1 This large topic will only be briefly be touched on below.
For more on government regulations of standards see OECD [1991],
David [1987], David and Greenstein [1990], and Farrell and Shapiro
[1992]. See David and Steinmueller [1992] and Besen and Johnson
[1986] for an emphasis on issues in telecommunications.
6a. Too many hands: Many buyers and many sellers
Economic networks may not easily arise when decision-making
in a market is diffuse — i.e., when a market has many buyers and
many sellers, none of whom is responsible for a large percentage
of economic activity. This is disturbing since diffuse market
structures are typically very competitive and tend to allocate
scarce resources efficiently through price mechanisms. Many
policy issues would be simplified if diffuse market structures
give rise to desirable economic networks.
When decision-making is diffuse, the problems that arise are
often called "coordination problems" (Farrell and Saloner
[1985]). This is not a statement about whether an economic
enterprise works properly. The main insight here is that all
potential users and suppliers- could benefit from as much
technical interoperability as possible, but not enough arises.
Because every potential user of a standard is a small part of the
whole, each decision maker has too little incentive to make the
investments that will coordinate the design decisions of other
users and lead to general interoperability. 2 The diffusion of
decision-making also can hinder adequate communication that would
render these coordination problems solved. The proliferation of
slightly different Unix systems in the 1970s is an often cited
example of this process. Thus, due to market structure alone, it
appears that network growth may be hindered because
standardization does not arise, or it arises too late (Cabral
[1987]). This analysis immediately leads to one disturbing
2 At least since the writings of Hemenway [1975], it has been
recognized that standards for networks have a "public goods"
quality — i.e., it is difficult to exclude anyone from using a
standard and many economic agents can benefit from their use
without influencing the costs to anyone else. As is generally the
case with public goods, in the absence of actions by government or
industry organizations, standards will be underprovided by
unrestricted markets (Dybvig and Spatt [1983], Kindleberger
[1983])
.
prediction for the growth of private telecommunications networks.
When these networks grow larger and brush up against one another,
they may be unable to work together for the simple reason that no
one bothered to insure that they initially developed in a
technically compatible manner.
When unsponsored economic networks develop and build
capacity, they tend to grow and shrink for many reasons that may
have only a minor correspondence with the long-term economic
welfare of market participants. This is because the development
of an economic network is often characterized by "bandwagons"
(Farrell and Saloner [1985]
,
[1986b] , David [1987], Postrel
[1985]). For example, networks may be slow to start when they are
small and many potential adopters "sit on the fence," waiting to
make expensive and unrecoverable investments until a clear
technical standard has been chosen by a large fraction of other
users. Networks may not develop at all if most participants are
"lukewarm" about a new standard due to technical uncertainty, for
example, even though all would collectively benefit from it.
Alternatively, bandwagons may also grow (remarkably!) quickly
once a network's size becomes large enough to justify investments
by potential adopters who, in the early phase of development, had
delayed making commitments. The lack of communication between all
the potentially affected decision makers exacerbates such
bandwagons, but economists have little to say about precisely
what type of communication channels are needed.
A very costly problem arises if capacity of a network
becomes "locked-in" to a technical alternative, i.e. users and
suppliers find it very costly to change fundamental technical
specifications (Arthur [1988], David [1985], Farrell and Saloner
[1986a], Greenstein [1991]). Either hardware or software embodies
technical features that cannot be easily changed or humans cannot
be easily retrained to work with different technology. These
costs are especially high when a network must change (e.g., be
8upgraded, expanded, or replaced) and the network serves as an
essential part of an organization's day to day operations. For
example, the FAA's air traffic control system (Kelman [1990]) or
a company's reservation system cannot easily be altered. Change
risks significant downtime arising from the costs of fixing the
almost inevitable mistakes that any change produces (Greenstein
[1991]).
Lock-in potentially leads to two related problems. First, a
network may not become as large or as valuable as possible
because users lock-in to a disparate variety of formats and each
finds it costly to change later. The second problem is related.
If many potential adopters wait for a "shake-out", then crucial
choices between technologies may be made by early adopters. Thus,
early adopters bear a disproportionate influence over standards
if their decisions lead to technical designs that cannot easily
be altered to accommodate the different needs of the later
decision-makers. For example, the installed base of color
television sets in the US today all use one set of standards that
is incompatible with many of the new high-definition television
(HDTV) standards possible. Many observers think it is too costly
to abandon this installed base and, thus, recommend using a high-
definition standard that is backward compatible with the
installed base, even if doing so sacrifices some of the pictorial
quality possible with HDTV technologies or raises its cost
(Johnson [1990], Farrell and Shapiro [1992]).
It might be argued that the disproportionate influence of
early users is justified because these same users bear a high
risk for being intrepid, i.e., their investments in a network can
become obsolete or "orphaned". 3 However, this observation does
3
"In network industries, successful innovations often harm
the installed base of a user who bought equipment and training
before the new technology was available or recognized as the
incipient standard. If I develop a new mousetrap and you choose not
not really address the question of whether society gets an
optimal technology or not, which is the central policy issue. The
timing and character of the emergence of a particular network, if
one emerges at all, will be sensitive to many potentially
arbitrary factors influencing the decision making of the first
majority of adopters (David [1986]). This makes the outcome
rather unpredictable at the start and leaves no assurance that a
technically appropriate long-run solution will be result,
particularly when viewed with hindsight (Cowan [1987]) — i.e.
society can be "locked-in" to the wrong technology ex post.
This conceptual paradigm corresponds with many historical
cases. David [1985], [1986] showed how the interaction of
uncoordinated decisions by typing schools, typewriter
manufacturers, and early typists resulted in the adoption of the
QWERTY keyboard. This is of interest because a superior
alternative exists, yet market participants have never
coordinated a switch. 4 Other examples from information
technology markets are AM stereo (Besen and Johnson [1986], Berg
[1984], [1986]), FM stereo (Besen [1991]), micro-processor design
(Swann [1985], [1987], Wade [1992]), and, as noted, Unix
operating systems (Saloner [1989]).
Perhaps the most unsatisfying feature of the analysis of
unsponsored networks to date is its use of a stricter concept of
to buy it, I have not harmed you. If I develop a new computer
operating system, incompatible with the old one you already own,
and you choose not to buy it but millions of their users do, then
you will find your network benefits much diminished as a
consequence of the innovation. This stranding externality has no
direct parallel in industries without network effects (Farrell,
1987) ."
4 Liebowitz and Margolis [1989] cast doubt on whether the
historical evidence supports the view that Dvorack is a compelling
alternative. They argue that this casts doubt on David's
characterization of the episode.
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irreversibility than is warranted due to the realities of typical
technological and economic evolution. Are some features of a
technology more mutable than others? Are there degrees of lock-
in? Economic analysis has yet to fully understand how these
notions can be properly modified for situations where
interoperability for components evolve in constant flux, as
suppliers update and revise them for applications. The next
section will discuss the growing analysis of converters, which
partially addresses this issue.
The foregoing implies that the diffusion of decision making
leads to situations where (1) communication and sponsorship are
unlikely and (2) coordination problems are likely. Thus, it would
seem to follow that market structures with few vendors may not
suffer as much from coordination problems (Sirbu and Stewart
[1986]). However, such a conclusion is hasty if it is not
qualified properly. In markets with few vendors, the proprietary
interests of the vendors leads them to take strategic actions
designed to produce outcomes they favor. While this reduces the
severity of coordination problems, it does not eliminate them. A
sponsoring firm's strategic behavior produces other types of
distortions. Economists have analyzed the unimaginable number of
ways in which these distortions arise.
b. Hand to hand combat: Dueling sponsors.
Perhaps the most common occurrence in a market with few
vendors is "dueling sponsors" — each sponsor has proprietary
interests in an array of components that perform similar
functions but competitors employ different technical standards.
The VHS/Betamax duel in the VCR markets is a well-known and
interesting case (Cusumano et.al. [1991], Yasunori and Imai
[1992]). Such battles are common today in the computer software
and hardware industries (IBM vs. Apple in PCs, IBM vs DEC in
minis, Wordstar vs WordPerfect in word processing, etc.) and
increasingly in related telecommunications markets (e.g., FDDI vs
11
ATM) , where the duels may start as multi-firm contests but
quickly reduce to a handful of dominant participants, perhaps
followed by a fringe of niche market suppliers. Network duels
also commonly arise as sub-plots to related product market duels.
For example, different banks may use incompatible ATM networks,
or United Airlines and American Airlines sponsor incompatible
reservation systems.
If recent experience is any guide, this type of market
structure will likely characterize many, if not the majority, of
private economic networks in future markets in
telecommunications. Dueling involves a mix of sponsorship and
competition, often arising gradually as initially unrelated
networks take on similar tasks. Do these duels lead to optimal
economic networks, and, if not, what are the most problematic
distortions?
Economists are of two minds about dueling. On the one hand,
an important distortion from dueling is that it may prevent the
economic network from becoming as large as it possibly could be,
even if all users would benefit from a larger network. This is
because dueling sponsors have incentives to design incompatible
systems if incompatibility raises the costs to users of switching
to a rival sponsor's system (Klemperer [ 1987a, b,c], [1992]). Not
only will sponsoring firms design systems that are incompatible
with rival systems, but they may actively seek to prevent the
entry of gateway technologies — i,e., technical bridges between
incompatible networks (Carlton and Klamer [1983]). In addition,
the sponsor of a system would like nothing better than to raise
the costs to the experienced user from switching vendors, since
it makes a user reluctant to change networks.
Vendors like nothing more than to be the exclusive provider
of a technology to a locked-in buyer. First, it provides the
sponsor with market power during any repeat system purchase.
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Second, it guarantees a stream of related business. For example,
in computing networks locked-in buyers will purchase CPU upgrades
from their system sponsors, and often a majority of their
peripherals and software (Greenstein [1990b], [1991]). Third,
locked-in users can be manipulated for competitive advantage. For
example, in the case of computer reservation systems, the
sponsors were accused of locking in travel agents and then
manipulating the screen to favor the flights of the system
sponsor (Rotemberg and Saloner [1991]).
The analysis is slightly different if the dueling firms are
very different in size. A large system sponsor and small system
sponsor do not possess the same incentives to be interoperable. A
small firm usually wants interoperability and a large firm does
not. The benefits to vendors from accessing a rival network's
users is counter-balanced by the loss of market power from facing
competition from a rival vendor. Vendors with larger markets are
less likely to desire compatibility with smaller rivals (than the
smaller rival does with them) because larger firms gain less from
selling to a few more customers and potentially lose more from
facing more competition (Katz and Shapiro [1985], Katz [1986],
Berg [1985]). An example of this behavior might be IBM's role in
blocking the development of ASCII standards for mainframe
computers (see Brock [1975]) and allegedly in plug-compatible
equipment markets as well (Brock [1989]). Similar factors, as
well as several pricing issues, prevented ATM networks from
working together as one large network for many years (Phillips
[1987] , Salop [1990])
.
Yet, economists are not uniformly pessimistic about dueling
because dueling sponsors will not design incompatible systems in
every circumstance. When rival sponsors provide components that
perform different functions or complementary functions,
compatibility permits many "mix-and-match" possibilities between
the components of rival systems (Matutes and Regibeau [1987],
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[1988], [1989], Economides [1988], Economides and Salop [1991]).
In turn, this raises the profitability of producing compatible
components (despite increases in competition) . The market for
stereo equipment is a familiar example (Postrel [1990]), as is
the market for PC hardware clones and software applications
(Langlois and Robertson [1990]). Thus, dueling sponsors are
likely to find it worthwhile to make investments to reduce
interoperability costs when they do not produce every type of
component, or if each has comparative advantage in the design and
production of some but not all components, which is a common
occurrence when markets participants have different technical
capabilities. This is probably a good explanation for the
willingness of many firms, AT&T and IBM increasingly so, to
participate in markets with open standards.
Dueling standards may also be economically efficient if a
variety of standards is appropriate for a variety of potential
problems (Farrell and Saloner [1986c]). The crucial question is
whether the market will permit entry of a new standard suited to
a minority of users; this may depend on the strength of "lock-in"
effects or the success of actions of system sponsors to foreclose
or induce entry of complementary products, such as software
(Church and Gandal [1990a], [1990b], [1992], Gandal and Salant
[1992]). For example, lock-in effects are present in the market
for local-area networks, and yet, the different standards for
local-area networks and metropolitan-area networks respond to the
different needs of users. Thus, lack of interoperability may not
impose a big loss on society in this instance because it provides
options to different users with different needs (Lehr [1990],
[1991a])
.
Another reason for optimism is that competition and
innovation counter balance some of the distortions from lock-in.
Monopoly profits may be dissipated through competitive bidding
between the rival system sponsors. Since many buyers anticipate
14
that their vendors will later gain monopoly benefits from their
exclusive sales of complementary products, they will demand
compensation before they commit to investing in network capacity
with proprietary features (Klemperer [1987 b]
, [1989], [1992],
Farrell and Shapiro [1988], [1989]). 5 Such demands can
potentially elicit "promotional pricing" from sponsors (see Besen
and Johnson [1986]). The good news is that the networks with
long-run economic advantages are likely to provide bigger price
discounts (Katz and Shapiro [1986a], [1986b]). The bad news is
that this benefit sometimes accrues only to new users and not
necessarily to users with an installed base of equipment. 6 In
addition, competitive bidding for new customers may spur
incumbent system vendors to innovate. For example, some observers
argue that inter-system competition was a primary driver of
computer system innovation in the 1960s and 1970s (Fisher,
McGowan and Greenwood [1983], Fisher, McKie, and Mancke [1983]).
As with unsponsored economic networks, the market's choice
between dueling systems still retains the sensitivity to small
events (Arthus [1988], Hanson [1984]), which is some cause for
concern. A well-researched example comes from the early history
of electrical power supply. Though engineering evidence seems to
suggest that alternative current is probably superior to direct
5 Certainly buyers do not possess perfect foresight in all
situations, nor are they able to pursue strategies that take
advantage of the intertemporal link in vendor strategies. For
example, Greenstein [1991] shows how the hierarchical relationships
within an organization often weaken the links between decisions
regarding large capital outlays, such as a computer system. Indeed,
Cabral and Greenstein [1990] show that organizations can often be
better off if they ignored these costs in their vendor decision.
The critical issue is whether system sponsors can
successfully "price-discriminate" — i.e. identify separate groups
of buyers and systematically charge them different prices and
prevent one group of buyers from selling to the other. If price
discrimination is feasible, then only new users benefit from system
competition.
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current for widespread use, David and Bunn's [1988] study shows
that many other factors, including "beauty contests" and the
decisions of crucial industry participants, such as Edison and
Westinghouse, and the character of the gateways between AC and
DC, determined how alternative current was chosen over direct
current. In a more current example, Cusumano, et. al. [1990]
showed that the development of the VCR standard was sensitive to
the relationship of Sony and Hitatchi Corporations, the seemingly
minor (and temporary) ability of VHS to record longer, and, most
crucially, the timing of the introduction of video cassettes,
which occurred unexpectedly and rather randomly from the
viewpoint of the major VCR manufacturers.
One of the more fascinating features of duels is that
dueling may induce actions that ultimately lead to the success of
one economic network but the loss of the sponsor's control over
it. For example, a firm may broadly license a technology to
establish it as a standard, but in so doing, sacrifice its
control over the standard and much of the monopoly profits
associated with that control. Sun Microsystems' liberal licensing
strategy with the SPARC workstations can be interpreted this
way. 7 Another variant of this phenomenon is for a firm to design
a product that is "open", i.e., that does not contain proprietary
technology. The open system induces entry of more peripheral and
software suppliers and hardware clones. This makes the hardware
conforming to the standard more valuable to users, while the
entry of more clones reduces the price. The development of
software and peripherals for the IBM-compatible personal computer
followed this pattern (Langlois and Robertson [1990]). Once the
standard was widely accepted (partially as a result of all this
entry) , IBM no longer garnered much of the rents from being the
7 However, a sponsor will sometimes give away the standard in
the hopes of dominating markets for components later on. Thus, not
all monopoly rents are necessarily lost (e.g., Farrell and Gallini
[1988] or the discussion in David and Greenstein [1989]).
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original sponsor of the standard. Indeed, today IBM and a
consortia of private firms are battling to determine the
direction of the next generations of "IBM-compatible" machines.
One other interesting feature of duels is that conditions of
competition can shift suddenly and asymmetrically due to the
availability of converters, translators and emulators from third
parties (which reduces the costs of interoperability between
networks) . David and Bunn [1988] show that the introduction of
the dynamo greatly influenced the AC/DC battle at the turn of the
century. More recently, a number of third party vendors today
supply programs that enable Apple Macintosh computers to use IBM
software, but they are not designed to allow IBM systems to use
Macintosh system software. Thus, the benefit from these gateways
is asymmetric. Most of the advantages accrues to those owning a
Macintosh system. Notice that since the benefits are asymmetric,
the incentives to introduce a converter will probably not match
society's. Moreover, as noted, parties that do not benefit from
the introduction of a converter may actively seek to prevent
their introduction. Economides and Woroch [1992] show how similar
issues arise when telecommunication network providers consider
connecting competitive access providers.
Perhaps the greatest weakness of the economic analysis of
dueling systems is also its strength — the long list of possible
outcomes. Prediction is quite difficult, particularly in view of
the multiplicity of pricing and promotional strategies typically
available to firms and the technical changes affecting most
information technology networks. How can the analysis of duels be
modified for situations where standards are in constant flux and
where products undergo a predictable life-cycle? There is a need
to arrive at a more systematic understanding of the incentives to
design and promote products that are incompatible or compatible
with present and future generations (e.g., Rotemberg and Saloner
[1991])
.
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c. A strong hand: dominant seller as sponsor
A very natural solution to coordination problems arises in
economic network that have only a single sponsor associated with
them. All design decisions, upgrading and maintenance problems
are internalized within the structure of a single firm. Many
readers will recognize this as the traditional model of telephone
networks or as IBM's vision for integrating computers and
telecommunications under the System Network Architecture (SNA)
model. Commercial networks such as Prodigy, America-Online, and
CompuServe, have also tried to adopt this model, though their
competition often forces them into duels. Unifying control within
a single firm generally eliminates competing designers and
provides users with certainty about who controls the evolution of
standards and their ultimate compatibility. This potential
benefit from single firm sponsorship cannot be de-emphasized,
especially in markets subject to uncertain and rapid changes in
technology.
Unfortunately, single firm sponsorship by a supplier8 also
brings much baggage with it. There is an old general concern that
large firms have disproportionate influences upon market
processes and they manipulate them to their advantage at the
expense of society's long term interests. Similarly, economic
networks may be dominated by the large firm (who sponsors the
network) and not necessarily to good ends. Most of these concerns
fall under the realm of anti-trust economics or traditional
regulatory economics.
Anti-trust and regulatory issues inevitably arise because a
8 It is rare, but notable, to observe the opposite, a large
buyer acting as a network sponsor. For example, the U.S. Department
of Defense has sponsored a network of products using ADA. Another
is the GM and Boeing sponsorship of the MAP/TOP standards. See
Bartik [1985], Teresko [1986], and Bresnahan and Chopra [1989].
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single sponsor is never alone. 9 He is often competing with small
plug-compatible component suppliers in some or all component
markets where standards are well-established. For example, IBM
battled plug-compatible component suppliers from the later 1960s
onward. Similarly, from the mid 1950s on (and growing thereafter)
AT&T faced competition in customer premise equipment markets and
long-distance. Today local Bell operating companies often face
competitive by-pass to their services. Anti-trust concerns arise
because the dominant firm always wishes to prevent the component
firms from gaining market share (and may even want to drive them
out of business) , while society can possibly benefit from the
added competition. Controlling and manipulating technical
features of a product, or effectively raising the costs of
interconnection, may enhance a sponsor's strategies aimed at
gaining competitive advantage over rivals. 10
There are two difficult issues regarding competitive
behavior to address. First, under what conditions will a dominant
firm manipulate a technology to his advantage and to the
detriment of potential entrants and consumers? Second, can and
should such behavior be regulated, i.e., are the benefits from
preventing inappropriate market conduct greater than the side-
effects from imposing an imperfect legal or regulatory rule? Most
9 Besen and Saloner [1988] and David and Greenstein [1990]
discuss both of these controversial subject at length, so only a
brief summary of the issues will be provided here.
10 The dominant firm can take actions like "refusing to sell
the primary good to a rival; selling only complete systems and not
their components; selling both system components but setting high
prices for components if purchased separately; 'underpricing'
components that compete with those sold by rivals; and
'overpricing' components that are needed by rivals to provide
complete systems (Besen and Saloner [1988])." Weiman and Levin
[1992] argue that AT&T's behavior during the early history of the
United State telephone system, when AT&T controlled critical nodes
in the network and refused to connect potential rivals, also raises
predatory questions.
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observers stumble on the first question, and even if observers
clearly describe (in non-polemic tones) a sponsor's strategies
that are inappropriate for society, they may fail on the second
set of issues. Policy rules that prevent inappropriate behavior
will almost always also deter perfectly acceptable behavior as
well.
As a result, many relevant debates are unresolved. Open
debate surrounds any analysis of "leveraging", for example, i.e.
using monopoly power in one component market to gain competitive
advantage in another. Most economists agree that courts have
carelessly applied this concept (Bowman [1957]), leading to
enormous arguments over an appropriate definition. Definitions
aside, there is no question that a network sponsor can delay
entry of complementary component suppliers (Greenstein [1990a]),
or foreclose entry altogether (Whinston [1989], Church and Gandal
[1990b]). For example, AT&T's resistance to designing modular
telecommunication connections delayed entry of competition for
customer premises equipment (Brock [1986] ). 11 The important (and
unresolved) policy question is whether such behavior should be or
can be regulated to any good end. One big problem, though not the
only one, is that if courts get in the business of second-
guessing every innovation by a dominant firm, especially those
with exclusionary features, it is widely believed that it will
have a chilling effect on many firm's willingness to introduce
any innovation, which normally is not in society's long term
interest. 12
11 A sponsor's ability to influence its rivals may be further
enhanced if many buyers are uncommitted to networks: if there is a
short "window of opportunity" before buyers become locked into a
supplier (David [1990], Farrell and Saloner [1986b]), delaying
entry may deter it altogether.
12 Similar questions permeate debate about whether product
innovation in systems of interrelated components is always
beneficial or is "predatory" in some sense (Ordover and Willig
[1981], Ordover, Sykes and Willig [1985], Besen and Saloner
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The related legal debate is as unresolved as the academic
debate. Though the number of cases involving the analysis of
market power and standardization has been modest, it would not be
surprising if these issues arise again in future
telecommunications markets. The legacy of the IBM antitrust
victories has left firms considerable latitude in the use of
standardization for strategic purposes (Knox [1984], Menell
[1987]). However, since such fundamental principles are at stake,
these rulings will probably be further tested by future cases.
For example, the FTC investigation of Microsoft and the recent
anti-trust suits against Nintendo may foreshadow such a trend
(Lunney [1990]). In addition, important rulings are likely to
come from several on-going trials that raise issues in
intellectual property rights in computer software standards, and
also in trials that attempt to modify Judge Green's restrictions
on the Regional Bell Operating Companies. 13
Issues regarding sponsorship are likely to remain -
controversial as long as there is no consensus regarding the
proper role for monopolies in nascent industries. From a grand
policy perspective, the apparent biases inherent in a dominant
firm's decision must be traded-off against apparent gains from
the effects of coordinating product characteristics and
[1988]). Another issue is whether "controlling standards," which
various writers define differently, can be used to a controlling
firm's benefit at all if competition between systems limits the
returns to such behavior (Adams and Brock [1982], Braunstein and
White [1985], Carlton and Klamer [1983], Fisher [1979]).
13 Also important are many future regulatory decisions
regarding interconnection and by-pass on local telephone networks,
as well as rulings on the private and public boundaries on the
growing electronic networks of this country. These will probably
arise out of a mix of FCC decisions, state PUC decisions,
Congressional law-making, and court decisions. For example, see
Kahin [1992],
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production process specifications. Thus, this topic raises
difficult (static) issues regarding the appropriate boundary for
a natural monopoly in industries where compatibility is
important, important (dynamic) issues regarding the likelihood of
innovation in the presence or absence of a monopolized network
industry, and unresolvable (political) issues regarding the
efficacy of regulatory institutions. No consensus on these issues
is likely to emerge soon in telecommunications or any other
network industry.
III. Invisible Advisors?; Cooperation, and its Costs
As noted above, there are many situations in which all
component suppliers have an interest in seeing the emergence and
the growth of an economic network. Yet, structural impediments
may produce coordination problems. The strong mutual interest all
firms have in the emergence of an economic network can lead firms
to forego market processes and attempt to develop standards in
organizations that combine representation from many firms. How do
these groups work and do they work well?
a. A helping hand: Consortia and competition
One institutional form for developing standards involves
industry groups, or a "consortia" of firms who sponsor an
economic network. That is, suppliers jointly operate an
organization responsible for designing, upgrading, and testing a
compatibility-standard. This institutional arrangement is
becoming increasingly popular in information technology
industries, partially as an outgrowth of joint-research ventures
(Weiss and Cargill [1992]). Though consortia do not have a well-
documented history, a few examples have pointed out some of the
economic strengths and pitfalls of developing standards through
these groups.
The greatest economic benefit of these groups is that they
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may accelerate development of complementary components. Success
is more likely when all the companies (who may directly compete
in a particular component market) find a common interest in
developing products that complement their competitive offering.
The consortia help induce other firms to produce complementary
components because the consortia's existence acts as a guarantee
that a standard's integrity will be maintained in the future. Of
course, there may still be insufficient investment in
complementary products since no producer internalizes the entire
interest of the network, but some investment is often better than
nothing, which is enough to begin development of an economic
network. The involvement of Grocer's groups in the development of
bar-codes for retail products is an example of this type of
involvement (Kheen [1988]). Consortia may also help bridge
regional isolation, as was necessary, for example, to establish
national ATM networks (Salop [199Q]).
Consortia are not a perfect solution to coordination
problems. They can easily fall prey to some of the same
structural impediments that prevented network development in
their absence. The experience with the development of UNIX
standards in the 1980s amply illustrates these weaknesses
(Saloner [1990]). The founding firms perceived the consortia as
tools to further their own economic interests and block
unfavorable outcomes. As a result, two different consortia
sponsor two different UNIX standards, and industry participants
have lined themselves up behind one or the other based on their
economic self-interest. While two standards surely is better than
the multiplicity that existed before, there does not seem to be
sufficient heterogeneity in user needs to merit two standards.
Society would probably be better off with one standard, but
supplier self-interest will prevent that.
The other potential danger with consortia, as when any group
of competing firms cooperate, is that such organizations may
23
further the interests of existing firms, possibly to the
detriment of potential entrants or users. For example, consortia
may aid collusive activities through joint pricing decisions
(Salop [1990]), or may serve as vehicles to raise entry barriers,
chiefly by stifling the development of technology that
accommodate development of products that compete with the
products of firms inside the consortia (USFTC [1983]). More
understanding of consortia will be needed before it is clear
whether this is a common practical problem or an unfounded fear.
After all, it may be difficult to both credibly invite
development of complementary components and deter development of
competing components.
b. Another helping hand: voluntary standardization organizations
One of the reasons private consortia are often unnecessary
is that other well-established professional organizations serve
similar functions. Many large umbrella groups that cut across
many industries, such as CCITT, IEEE, ASTM, and ANSI, have a long
history of involvement in the development of technical standards
(Cropper [1980], Hemenway [1975], Cargill [1989], Spring
[1991]) 14 . These groups serve as a forum for discussion,
development and dissemination of information about standards
(Weiss and Sirbu [1990]). In the past, such groups largely
codified standards determined by market processes. Today a whole
alphabet soup full of groups are involved with anticipating
technical change in network industries and guiding their design
(Witten [1983], Cargill [1989], David and Greenstein [1989,
1990], Besen [1990], OECD [1991]). Their role in designing
"anticipatory" standards takes on special urgency in economic
networks in danger of locking- in to irreversible standards
14 More than 4 00 organizations have been estimated to be at
work in this country developing, revising, and reviewing standard
(U.S. Federal Trade Commission [1983], Toth [1984]), though a few
groups tend to dominate the development of information technology
standards.
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choices.
One important feature of most of these organizations is that
they are "voluntary". 15 In other words, designers must have some
economic reasons for embedding a technical standard in their
product, since use is optional. Another important feature of
voluntary organizations is that participating firms have
discretion over the degree of their involvement. In other words,
though most firms belong to the relevant umbrella groups, their
contribution of resources to development can wax or wane for a
variety of technical and strategic reasons. This can lead to
either extraordinary investment in the process to influence
outcomes or to "free-riding" off the activities of the
organization.
Voluntary standards organizations play many useful roles in
solving network coordination problems, especially those related
to lack of communication. They can serve as a forum for affected
parties to educate each other about the common perception of the
problems to be solved (Sirbu and Hughes [1986]). They can also
serve as a legal means to discuss and plan the development of a
network of compatible components (Weiss and Sirbu [1990]), as
well as document agreements about the technical specification of
a standard and disseminate this information to interested parties
[Sirbu and Zwimpfer [1985]). And perhaps most importantly, their
standards can serve as a focal point to designers who must choose
among many technical solutions when imbedding a standard in a
component design. In other words, these groups are most likely to
succeed when market participants mutually desire
15 The major exception in the United States is when standards
written by voluntary standards groups are required by law or
administrative fiat, as with building codes (Rosenberg [1976],
USFTC [1983]). When governments get involved, it is often for the
purpose of writing or choosing a standard directly. On occasion
government bodies will also rely on those standards determined by
an industry umbrella group. See the discussion below.
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interoperability, need to establish a mechanism for communication
and need a mechanism to develop or choose one of many technical
alternatives (Besen and Johnson [1986]).
Voluntary standards groups are also no panacea for the
structural impediments to network development in some markets.
They will fail to produce useful standards when the self-interest
of participants prevents it in any event (Lehr [1992]). For
example, a dominant firm need not follow the recommendations of a
voluntary standardization group. Moreover, it is not likely to do
so if it believes that it can block entry and successfully market
its products without the standard. IBM's marketing of systems
using EBCDIC rather than ASCII is one such example (Brock
[1975]). 16 Similar impasses may occur in a market with dueling
technologies, although a voluntary group can play an important
role in a duel: if it chooses a particular standard, it could
swing the competitive balance in favor of one standard rather
than another. However, each sponsoring firm may try to block the
endorsement of its rival's standard as a means to prevent this
result, which may effectively prevent any standard from being
adopted by the voluntary group. The strategies employed in such
committee battles can become quite complex (Farrell and Saloner
[1988] , Lehr [1991b])
.
In addition, no administrative process may be able to guide
the development of a network when a slow administrative process
cannot keep up with new technical developments (Lehr [1989]).
When events become too technically complex and fluid, a focal
point is easily lost. This problem is already arising as private
telecommunications grow and private groups attempt to coordinate
interconnection of their networks based on the ISDN model. One
16 Note, however, that any advantages IBM accrued were strictly
temporary. Bridges between the two standards are common place and
virtually costless today.
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problem with ISDN is that the value from anticipating
developments (on such an ambitious scale) is reduced if, as parts
of the ISDN standard are written, the character of technology has
changed enough to make the standard inadequate. In other words,
the standard does not serve as a guide to component designers if
the standards organization must frequently append the standard.
Since no government administrative process could obviously do any
better, market processes will usually predominate instead,
coordination problems and all.
Since the decisions of voluntary groups can influence
economic outcomes, any interested and organized party will make
investments in order to manipulate the process to its advantage.
As a result, user interests tend to be systematically
unrepresented, since users tend to be diffuse and not technically
sophisticated enough to master many issues. In addition, large
firms have an advantage in volunteering resources that influence
the outcome, such as volunteering trained engineers who will
write standards that reflect their employees' interests. Finally,
"insiders" have the advantage in manipulating procedural rules,
"shopping" between relevant committees and lobbying for their
long-term interests (Lehr [1991b]). Thus, committees have their
own focus, momentum, and inertia, which will necessarily shape
the networks that arise. As a general rule, the consensus rules
governing most groups tends to favor backward-looking designs of
standards using existing technology.
As with consortia, voluntary standardization activities may
aid collusive activities (USFTC [1983]). The suppliers that
dominate standards-writing will want to further the interests of
existing firms, not potential entrants or users. As with
consortia, standards may serve as vehicles to raise entry
barriers by stifling the development of components from new
entrants. These biases are well-known, and are often held in
check by the presence of anti-trust lawyers and the professional
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ethics of the engineers who design standards.
In sum, voluntary standards organizations can improve
outcomes for participants and society, particularly when they
make up for the inadequate communication of a diffuse market
structure. They are one more avenue through which a system may
develop and one more channel through which firms may communicate.
They are, however, just a committee, with no power to compel
followers. In highly concentrated markets, their functions can be
influenced by the narrow self-interest of dueling firms or
dominant firms.
IV. Magical Hands: Innovation and Industry evolution
The discussion until now has treated the growth of economic
networks as the byproduct of initial conditions of a market. The
number of participants, the diffusion of the ownership of assets
and other chance market factors influence strategic interests,
which determines market behavior, which in turn determines market
outcomes. To this must be added an important long-run feedback:
as network industries mature, standardization alters a market's
structure. While this feedback is easily recognized, it is not
well-understood. Usually several factors may be at work at once
and they will not work in the same direction.
a. Nurturing hands?: Maturing networks and long run change
A mature network may contain features that both encourage
and discourage innovation. Well defined technical standards may
provide components suppliers a more secure set of interfaces
around which to design a product and thus, may encourage research
and development into the design of new components for a network
(Putnum, Hayes and Bartlett [1982], Link and Tassey [1987], David
and Steinmueller [1992]). For example, secure telecommunication
transmission standards were important in hastening innovation in
customer premises markets, such as facsimile machines and modems.
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Indeed, Noam [1991] has observed more generally that the success
of a communications network sponsor, such as AT&T, comes from
developing and standardizing the technology of its network.
Ironically, the sponsor's success lays the seeds for later third-
party component competition.
On the other hand, an installed base of users may also be an
unintended hindrance for innovation on a mature network (Katz and
Shapiro [1986a, b] . An existing substitute network may hinder the
growth of a new networks, because the technology embedded in much
existing equipment may be inappropriate for a new application,
raising its cost. In addition, minority interests may be burdened
with higher costs on an existing network, but may not be large
enough to justify setting up a new network. For example, Besen
[1991] argued that the existing AM network hindered the post-WWII
growth of the FM network.
Economists are equally ambivalent about the influence of
technical change on a network's market structure. As noted above,
the factors producing less concentration are strong: network
sponsors may have incentives to license their standard as a means
to induce development of new components. In addition, standards
may encourage product innovation and new entry by reducing
technical uncertainty. For example, the establishment of open
systems within the PC industry hastened the entry of multitudes
of hardware, component and software suppliers, which makes the
industry incredibly dynamic and competitive today (Langlois and
Robertson [1990], Robertson and Langlois [1992]).
However, the factors leading to greater concentration are
equally as strong: buyers often have strong incentives to use a
single economic network. If a firm has a proprietary right over
the technically superior network technology, then through
appropriate strategic actions (and a little luck) the sponsor may
be able to mushroom its advantages into dominant control of
29
several technically related market niches. IBM's early success in
the mainframe market with the system 3 60 can be interpreted this
way (Brock [1975], [1989], Fisher et. al . [1982], [1983]).
Intel's ability to wrestle back control over the manufacturing of
x86 microprocessor market can also be interpreted this way.
Similarly, some observers claim that Microsoft will be able to
use its control of MS-DOS and Windows for advantages in related
markets
.
Several case studies are beginning to sort between these
contrasting ideas. Events from the micro-processor markets (Wade
[1992]), computing markets (Bresnahan and Greenstein [1992]), and
broadcasting (Owen and Wildman, Ch. 7 [1992]) point toward the
following conclusion: First, there is a trade-off between
sponsorship and type of innovation. If a network is largely
sponsored than it can more easily introduce innovations on a
systemic level, i.e. on a level that influences many components
at once. Typically systemic innovations are technically complex
and more easily coordinated within a single organization. One
draw-back to sponsorship, however, is that sponsors of networks
tend to resist too much innovation because sponsors do not want
to cannibalize their own products. In contrast, economic networks
with diffuse ownership, where dueling is more common, tend to
lead to greater innovation from suppliers of component parts.
However, diffuse ownership, even combined with established
producer groups or standards-writing groups, does not tend to
lead to systemic innovations, because of the difficulties of
coordinating complex technical change across many organizations.
Second, there is a tension between the role of sponsorship
in bringing about coordination and in leading to market power.
When networks compete, there is a long run tendency for networks
to become less sponsored, because many users resist the market
power inherent in such sponsorship, choosing products with wider
supplier bases whenever possible. However, many users also
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strongly desire that at least one market institution take on a
central coordination role. Because of their long-term commercial
interest in the network, a single sponsor can often do a better
job at coordinating a network than producer groups or standards-
writing groups. The best example of both these tensions comes
from the last thirty years of platform competition in the
computing market, where users have gradually been moving from
sponsored networks, such as those based on the IBM3 60 mainframe
platform or the DEC VAX platform, to unsponsored open PC
networks, such as those based on the Intel x86 chip and MS-DOS
operating system.
In any event, soothsaying about the long-run economic
potential of a young economic network usually takes a bit of
chutzpa (which, of course, does not prevent futuristic
technologists from doing it) . Some highly touted platforms gain
wide acceptance and some do not. Just contrast the experience
that followed the introduction of music on compact disks with
what occurred after the introduction of digital audio tape. It is
often hard to pinpoint the causes of success or failure. In
product markets that regularly undergo radical product innovation
it will not be clear at the outset how valuable a product or
service will be, nor what the costs each technical alternative
may impose on later technical developments, nor how large the
network will grow as new applications are developed. As a result,
it is also difficult to predict a market's dynamics. For example,
none of the important firms in the VCR industry in the later
1970s anticipated either the consequences for hardware
competition from the development of the rental movie market, nor
the power of the economic links between geographically separate
markets (Cusumano et. al. [1990], Baba and Imai [1992]). In a
more current case, technical uncertainty makes it difficult to
predict whether the technical requirements implicit in ISDN will
limit or enhance competition. After all, ISDN will influence
product design and network growth, which in turn may influence
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other factors such as tariff structures, network controls and
plant investment (David and Steinmueller [1990], [1992], Lehr
[1989], Lehr and Noll [1989]).
What is the bottom line of all this? Since new technologies
are embedded in new generations of equipment, many network
capacity investment decisions determine the ultimate capability
of the network. While little can be predicted about the full
nature of these investments, economists do largely predict that,
whether or not a network is sponsored or unsponsored, vendors
often do not have sufficient incentives to make their capacity
interoperable with each other or with potential competitor
networks. Thus, one can make a case for limited government
intervention aimed at guaranteeing at least the minimal amount of
interoperability needed to induce technical change and capacity
investment. For example, this is a frequently used argument for
government regulation of electronic protocols in the national
electronic network (Kahin [1992]). Some observers fear wide-
spread technical chaos in the absence of minimal standardization.
In sum, the only predictable feature of many information
technology networks is that they change. It is not surprising if
two snap shots of any particular market niche taken sufficiently
far apart in time may reveal different firms, radically different
products and applications, and even different buyers. From an
individual supplier's or user's perspective, this uncertainty
complicates decisions with long-run consequences, since
investment in physical equipment is expensive, as is investment
in the assets complementary to any network, such as in trained
support staff in an organization.
b. Hand-cuffed: Lock-in and control of technical options.
Not much research bridges the distance between theoretical
models of economic networks and the concerns of practioneers in
network industries. That is, most buyers and sellers in an
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evolving industry know that change will come and that its
character will be unpredictable. As a result, most product
designers and users of compatibility standards associate
potential problems with being locked-in to a narrow technical
choice. One of the most interesting and least understood aspects
of standardization processes is how attempts to avoid lock-in
influences design decisions and market outcomes in such a dynamic
setting. This approach tends to lead to a rather sanguine view of
a designer's ability to adjust to long run technical change in
network technologies.
One recent approach to these issues emphasizes the value
decision-makers place on having "strategic flexibility", i.e.,
having a choice among many future technical options. This
approach extends "option theory" to product design decision (for
one line of development, see Sanchez [1991]). Its starting
premise is that much technology choice involves discontinuous
choices among alternatives. Thus, an important determinant of an
investment is the uncertain revenue stream associated with future
technical alternatives. Product designers and technology users
will expend resource today in order to not fore-close technical
alternatives associated with potentially large revenue streams.
The greater the uncertainty at one time, the greater the value
placed on keeping technical choices open over time. The value of
strategic flexibility may far outweigh the value of any other
determinant of technology choice. This is interesting because it
provides a different spin on many dynamic factors influencing
network development.
For example, it explains how standards influence firm
decisions on whether to design a new product for a given product
line, delay introducing a new product, or invest in capacity for
an existing product line. A firm may choose to expend extra
resources to become part of the largest possible network (by
designing a standardized technical platform) because it cannot be
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certain which of many future designs will best suit its
customers. A firm may also expend extra resources to make its
products compatible with a mix and match network in order to give
buyers assurance that many applications may be available in the
future. A firm may hedge its bet by simultaneously employing
different technical standards that permit it to reverse its
commitment to a technical alternative.
Buyers will also expend resources to leave open options
affected by technical uncertainties. Buyers require evidence that
their technical options will remain open. For example, the
existence of many peripheral component suppliers assures that
buyer that an economic network caters to a variety of needs.
Alternatively, users may purchase general purpose technologies
(Bresnahan and Trajtenberg [1991]) rather than an application-
specific technology as a means to leave open their options for
future expansion. For example, Greenstein [1991] discussed how
federal mainframe computer users in the 1970s telescoped future
lock-in problems into the present and made investments in
"modular" programming as a result.
Shifts in technical conditions also influence outcomes in
administrative processes. If innovation frequently changes the
conditions of competition (e.g, concentration, the primary
applications) in an economic network, designers can expect to
periodically revise their products to remain interoperable.
Compromises will be reconsidered in light of new information that
new technical solutions may become feasible. In anticipation of
these changes standards committees may device a technical
platform that does not foreclose future technical possibilities
(Weiss and Cargill [1992]).
IV. Epilogue
Economic networks may develop through market mechanisms or
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voluntary organizations that combine market participants. Each of
these mechanisms may produce desirable outcomes or distort them,
depending on the market structure, chance historical events and
changes in the costs of technical alternatives. Diffuse market
structures produce coordination problems and communication
difficulties. More concentrated market structures will alleviate
some of the communication problems, but strategic interests will
distort incentives away from optimal outcomes. Administrative
processes may ameliorate communication problems, but distort
outcomes in other ways.
This paper's framework recognizes that in different markets
a wide range of different circumstances determine important
economic variables. In response to this heterogeneity, it
provides a handy check-list of basic questions to ask about an
economic network: How diffuse are the interests of the main
market participants? Is there one dominant firm, several dueling
firms, or no apparent leader at all? What are the incentives of
the main market participants to cooperate and communicate? What
costs do buyers of different technical alternatives face? Do
industry groups play an important role in shaping industry
standards? What is the rate of technical change and is its
direction predictable within normal planning horizons?
Many desirable and distorted outcomes are possible in
theory. In practice, it is often difficult to know what is a good
or bad choice. This mix of theoretical possibilities and
historical outcomes should warn economic observers and policy
makers against unwarranted optimism or undue pessimism about the
efficacy of using market mechanisms to guide the growth of
economic networks. Yet, if the dynamism in information technology
markets in the United States in the last few decades is any guide
to the future, then on balance the scales must lean towards an
optimistic view of the increasing reliance on decentralized
market mechanisms in telecommunications markets.
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